‘Judges shouldn’t be frightened to set precedents. A list of those that have “gone too far” – including over a Guardian freedom of information request on the Prince of Wales’s letters – risks deterring justice.’
The Guardian, 12th May 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘A county council has successfully defended in the Court of Appeal its decision to refuse an application to register rights of common under the Commons Act 2006.’
Local Government Lawyer, 10th May 2016
Source: www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk
‘A judicial review of a decision on a s.17 Children Act 1989 assessment of a homeless, non-eligible family. The issues were the extent of investigations required, and legitimate conclusions to be drawn from a lack of information provided.’
Nearly Legal, 8th May 2016
Source: www.nearlylegal.co.uk
‘Tribunals are entitled to take into account information that was not available to a health and safety inspector at the time that a notice was issued when hearing an appeal against that notice, the Scottish appeal court has ruled.’
OUT-LAW.com, 4th May 2016
Source: www.out-law.com
‘Call for investigation into case of Syrian boy who was locked up for almost a month despite having documents proving identity.’
The Guardian, 4th May 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘Local councils are facing legal action at the High Court today over their decisions to impose boycotts on Israeli goods produced in “illegal” Israeli settlements in the West Bank.’
The Independent, 4th May 2016
Source: www.independent.co.uk
‘The UK government is to be sued in the high court over its air pollution plans, just a year after losing at the supreme court and being ordered to fulfil its legal duty to cut pollution rapidly.’
The Guardian, 28th April 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘The families of the 96 people fatally injured at the 1989 FA Cup semi-final have been fighting for the truth for 27 years.’
The Guardian, 26th April 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
Regina (Al-Saadoon and others) v Secretary of State for Defence (No 2) [2016] EWHC 773 (Admin)
‘The claimants brought public law claims in the courts of the United Kingdom arising out of the British military involvement in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. The claims involved allegations of ill-treatment and in some cases unlawful killing, of Iraqi civilians by British soldiers. By their claims for judicial review the claimants sought court orders requiring the Secretary of State to investigate alleged human rights violations. Issues arose relating to the UK’s obligations under articles 2 and 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including (i) the nature and scope of the state’s substantive obligation under article 2 of the Convention in relation to the use of lethal force while seeking to quell riots and uphold law and order during the occupation of Iraq, (ii) when the investigative duty under article 2 arose in such circumstances and (iii) the effect of delay on the investigative duties under articles 2 and 3 where the allegations of breach of the substantive rights were made many years after the incidents in question.’
WLR Daily, 7th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Regina (Sino) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 803 (Admin)
‘Claiming that he had been unlawfully detained, the claimant sought, through the route of judicial review, immediate release from detention, determination of the defendant’s liability for his false imprisonment and resolution as to whether, if false imprisonment was established, damages should be compensatory or nominal. The defendant had detained the claimant under immigration powers for periods totalling seven years and two months. The judge held that the claimant had been unlawfully detained between 13 July and 10 December 2013 and was entitled to more than nominal damages for false imprisonment, to be assessed on a compensatory basis. The claimant failed in his public law claim in relation to accommodation, deportation and removal. An issue arose as to costs. The defendant contended, inter alia, that as the claimant had succeeded on only one issue out of four he was entitled to only 25% of his costs.’
WLR Daily, 12th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘Ealing’s allocation policy has already had lawfulness problems, compounded by Ealing’s unlawful refusal to do anything about that unlawfulness. But this judicial review of the policy was on a different basis and confirms a whole fresh ground of unlawfulness.’
Nearly Legal, 27th April 2016
Source: www.nearlylegal.co.uk
Regina (Hallam) v Secretary of State for Justice; Regina (Nealon) v Same [2016] EWCA Civ 355
‘Both claimants were convicted of serious criminal offences and had their initial appeals against conviction dismissed. In the first case the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the claimant’s conviction for murder to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), which quashed it on the basis the safety of the conviction was undermined by the unsatisfactory nature of identification evidence and doubts as to whether the claimant’s alibi had been falsely made. In the second case the commission referred the claimant’s conviction for attempted rape to the Court of Appeal, which quashed it on the basis that the weakness of identification evidence and fresh DNA evidence taken from the victim’s clothing had had a substantial effect on the safety of the conviction. In both cases the Secretary of State refused the claimant compensation, under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, as amended, on the basis that he had failed to show beyond reasonable doubt that the claimant had not committed the offence. The claimants’ claims for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decisions, on the grounds that section 133(1ZA) of the 1988 Act (inserted by section 175 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and providing that there has been a miscarriage of justice in relation to a person convicted of a criminal offence “if and only if the new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence”) was incompatible with article 6.2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in that it infringed the presumption of innocence, were dismissed by the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division which held that (i) the court was bound by authority of the Supreme Court (and also of the Court of Appeal) to hold that article 6.2 of the Convention was not applicable to compensation decisions made under section 133 of the 1988 Act; and (ii) the statutory scheme under section 133 maintained the presumption of innocence, did not require the applicant for compensation to prove his innocence and that only if the Secretary of State was satisfied that the new fact conclusively showed his innocence was compensation to be paid. The court also refused the claimant in the second case permission to proceed with a claim for judicial review on the basis that the Secretary of State was obliged to carry out a full review of the material before him in a particular case to determine whether the claimant was innocent.’
WLR Daily, 11th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘The Broads comprised over 300 square kilometres of wetland landscapes in east Norfolk and Suffolk. The Broads Authority (“the authority”) was constituted under the Norfolk and Suffolk Broads Act 1988 and had a general duty to manage the Broads. The authority was also the local planning authority for the area and a harbour and navigation authority. However, the Broads was not a National Park designated under the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, nor was the authority a National Park Authority under that statute. In January 2015 the authority passed a resolution by which it decided that the brand “Broads National Park” be adopted for marketing related purposes. The claimant sought judicial review of that decision on the ground, inter alia, that unless it conformed to the “Sandiford principle” it should not hold itself out as a National Park. That principle, set out in para 2.15 of the Report of the National Park Policies Review Committee 1974, stated that the preservation and enhancement of natural beauty should take precedence to the promotion of public enjoyment. An issue arose as to whether a public body which in law was not a National Park, could represent itself (and allow itself to be represented) as a National Park and thereby to enjoy the benefits of National Park status despite the fact that the public body had decided to cease to seek to become a National Park, inter alia, because it did not wish to be subject to the legal duties imposed on National Parks and National Park Authorities.’
Regina (Harris and another) v Broads Authority [2016] EWHC 799 (Admin)
WLR Daily, 12th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘A High Court judge has upheld Hull City Council’s judicial review claim over advice given by Newcastle City Council to Greggs under the ‘Primary Authority’ scheme.’
Local Government Lawyer, 12th April 2016
Source: www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk
‘Ever since R (Weaver) v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [2010] 1 WLR 363 (our report) there has been an ongoing issue as to whether housing associations (or specific housing associations) were public bodies both for the purposes of the Human Rights Act and public law/judicial review.’
Nearly Legal, 10th April 2016
Source: www.nearlylegal.co.uk
‘Michalak v The General Medical Council & Ors [2016] EWCA Civ 172: This important case deals with the remedies available to individuals who claim to have suffered from discrimination, victimization, harassment or detriment in the treatment they have received from a “qualifications body” under s.53 of the Equality Act 2010 viz. any authority or body which can confer a relevant qualification (e.g. the GMC, ACCA etc.). It also clarifies the understanding of the place of judicial review in the context of internal and statutory appeals in cases of alleged discrimination contrary to the Equality Act 2010.’
UK Human Rights Blog, 11th April 2016
Source: www.ukhumanrightsblog.com
‘A second legal challenge has been made over the government’s decision to impose a new contract on junior doctors in England.’
BBC News, 4th April 2016
Source: www.bbc.co.uk
General Medical Council v Michalak [2016] EWCA Civ 172
‘The claimant doctor made a complaint of discrimination against the respondent General Medical Council, alleging that, as a qualifications body, it had subjected her to a detriment in the course of its Fitness to Practise Panel procedure, contrary to section 53(2)(c) of the Equality Act 2010. At a preliminary hearing to determine whether the employment tribunal had jurisdiction under section 120 of the Act, an employment judge held that the claim was not excluded by section 120(7), as the act complained of was not subject “by virtue of an enactment” to “an appeal or proceedings in the nature of an appeal”, since there was no right of appeal under the Medical Act 1983 from a decision of the panel, nor did judicial review provide a means to challenge its decision. The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the General Medical Council’s appeal, holding that judicial review proceedings were proceedings “in the nature of an appeal” that arose “by virtue of an enactment”, namely section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, that were available to the claimant, thereby precluding the jurisdiction of the employment tribunal.’
WLR Daily, 23rd March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Regina v Roberts (Mark) and others [2016] EWCA Crim 71
‘In each of the 13 applications before the court, the applicants applied for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal against sentences of imprisonment or detention for public protection (“IPP”)), imposed between 2005 and 2008 under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Before the sentence of IPP was amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, the court was required to make the assumption that an offender was dangerous if he had been convicted on an earlier occasion of a specified offence, unless it was unreasonable to do so. Where he was found to be dangerous, and over 18, the court was required to pass a sentence of IPP or life imprisonment; the 2003 Act removed all discretion from the court once it was found that the offender was dangerous. All the applicants had either been detained in custody long after the expiry of the minimum term or had been recalled for breach of licence. The applicants submitted (1) that whatever might have been the position at the time the sentences of IPP were passed, the Court of Appeal had power under section 11 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to pass sentences that, in the light of what had happened over the intervening years, now would be the proper sentence; (2) the Court of Appeal should reconsider the assessments made by sentencing judges in the light of R v Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864; [2006] 1 WLR 2509, and (3) a time could and had been reached when the length of the imprisonment was so excessive and disproportionate compared to the index criminal offence that it could amount to inhuman treatment under article 3 or arbitrary detention under article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. That was because the detention no longer had any meaningful link to the index offence. A much delayed review of a sentencing decision could therefore be a mechanism the court could employ to avoid a breach of those Convention Rights. As the period now served by each of the applicants was so much longer than any conceivable determinate sentence would have required, the continued detention amounted to preventative detention and was therefore arbitrary. ‘
WLR Daily, 18th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘Following three trials of former members of Jehovah’s Witnesses’s congregations on charges of historic sex abuse the Charity Commission decided to initiate a statutory inquiry relating to a leading Jehovah’s Witness charity’s safeguarding policy regarding vulnerable beneficiaries in particular children, under section 46 of the Charities Act 2011, and to order the charity to produce a wide range of documents, under section 52 of the Act, even though none of those accused was connected with the charity. .The applicants, the charity and its trustees, sought judicial review of those decisions, on the grounds that (i) the commission had acted disproportionately by commencing an inquiry the scope of which was vague and undefined and by interfering with the applicants’ Convention rights, and had thereby breached its duty to act fairly so that the decision was irrational; and (ii) the scope of the production order was disproportionate in that information was sought of a personal and sensitive nature, within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998, and was furthermore in breach of the Convention rights of individuals affected. The judge in refusing permission to proceed with the judicial review clain held that the applicants had an effective statutory remedy by appealing to the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (Charity) against a decision to initiate an inquiry, and that any complaint relating to the breadth of a production order could be dealt with before that tribunal.’
WLR Daily, 15th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
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