Category: law reports

General Medical Council v Michalak – WLR Daily

Posted March 30th, 2016 in appeals, doctors, employment tribunals, equality, judicial review, jurisdiction, law reports by sally

General Medical Council v Michalak [2016] EWCA Civ 172

‘The claimant doctor made a complaint of discrimination against the respondent General Medical Council, alleging that, as a qualifications body, it had subjected her to a detriment in the course of its Fitness to Practise Panel procedure, contrary to section 53(2)(c) of the Equality Act 2010. At a preliminary hearing to determine whether the employment tribunal had jurisdiction under section 120 of the Act, an employment judge held that the claim was not excluded by section 120(7), as the act complained of was not subject “by virtue of an enactment” to “an appeal or proceedings in the nature of an appeal”, since there was no right of appeal under the Medical Act 1983 from a decision of the panel, nor did judicial review provide a means to challenge its decision. The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the General Medical Council’s appeal, holding that judicial review proceedings were proceedings “in the nature of an appeal” that arose “by virtue of an enactment”, namely section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, that were available to the claimant, thereby precluding the jurisdiction of the employment tribunal.’

WLR Daily, 23rd March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Estrada v Al-Juffali (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs intervening) – WLR Daily

Posted March 30th, 2016 in appeals, diplomats, divorce, financial dispute resolution, financial provision, human rights, immunity, international law, law reports, striking out by sally

Estrada v Al-Juffali (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs intervening) [2016] EWCA Civ 176

‘The parties were married in September 2001 and had one daughter born in October 2002. The husband, a Saudi national, was a businessman of substantial means who married again in 2012 when the parties’ marriage broke down. On their divorce the wife applied for financial relief under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. The husband applied to strike out the wife’s application , claiming immunity from suit as the permanent representative of St Lucia to the International Maritime Organisation (“IMO”), a post to which he had been appointed on 1 April 2014. The United Kingdom was required, as a matter of international law, to grant privileges and immunities to personal representatives of member states to the IMO in accordance with the Specialised Agencies Convention and the Headquarters Agreement. A permanent representative was entitled to the same immunity from suit and legal process as the head of a diplomatic mission, except that, by article 15 of the International Maritime Organisation (Immunities and Privileges) Order 2002), a permanent representative who was permanently resident in the United Kingdom was only entitled to immunities and privileges in respect of his official acts. The Foreign Secretary certified that the Foreign Office had been informed by the IMO of the husband’s appointment as permanent representative of St Lucia, of his arrival date and had not been notified that his diplomatic functions had terminated. Although on the face of it that certificate was conclusive evidence of the husband’s appointment by virtue of section 8 of the International Organisations Act 1968, the judge balanced the husband’s claim to immunity against the wife’s rights to access to the courts under article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. He concluded that the husband had not undertaken any duties or performed any functions as permanent representative, that the appointment was an artificial construct to defeat the wife’s claims on the breakdown of the marriage and that, since the husband was permanently resident in the United Kingdom, he was entitled to immunity only in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his functions. In consequence the judge refused to strike out the wife’s claim.’

WLR Daily, 22nd March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Regina v Goss – WLR Daily

Posted March 30th, 2016 in appeals, child abuse, law reports, rape, sentencing, sexual offences by sally

Regina v Goss

‘The defendant pleaded guilty to three charges of rape … one charge of aiding and abetting rape, two charges of indecent assault and one charge of indecency with a child. He was initially sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment on each of the rape charges and on the aiding and abetting rape charge, and four years’ imprisonment on each of the other charges, the seven sentences to run concurrently. The sentences of 16 years were calculated by taking a starting point of 24 years and deducting one-third for the guilty pleas. Some four weeks later the sentencing judge had the case re-listed and, in reliance on the “slip rule” in Crim PR r 28.4, he changed the four sentences of 16 years to 18 years on the footing that a reduction of 25%, not one-third, was appropriate in view of the fact that the defendant had made no admissions when, much earlier, the complainant had made complaints but no prosecution had resulted. The defendant appealed against sentence. Permission to appeal was given by the single judge on the ground that it had been established in R v Nodjoumi (1985) 7 Cr App R (S) 183 that it was incorrect to use the slip rule to change a sentence solely because the sentencing judge had, on reflection, concluded that the original sentence had been inadequate. On the hearing of the appeal, however, R v Nodjoumi was relied on only as support for a submission that the sentencing judge had not been justified in concluding that the reduction should be 25% rather than one-third.’

WLR Daily, 23rd March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Regina v Nguyen – WLR Daily

Posted March 30th, 2016 in appeals, attempts, evidence, grievous bodily harm, law reports, sentencing, time limits, weapons by sally

Regina v Nguyen, Attorney General’s Reference No 79 of 2015

‘The defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to inflict grievous bodily harm contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and to having an offensive weapon contrary to section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. He was sentenced to three years and four months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ imprisonment respectively. The Attorney General applied to the Court of Appeal under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient. At the same time the prosecution applied to the Crown Court under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 for the sentence to be varied on the grounds that new material showed that, contrary to the way in which the case had been presented at the sentencing hearing, the complainant had been specifically targeted by the defendant. The time limit for making a variation order was subsequently extended by a Crown Court judge, and a variation order was later made by the sentencing judge. The defendant appealed against the varied sentence. On the hearing in the Court of Appeal it was common ground that there was no power to extend the time limit for the making of a variation order, so that the variation order had been invalid.’

WLR Daily, 23rd March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Regina v Brooks – WLR Daily

Posted March 30th, 2016 in appeals, confiscation, conspiracy, drug offences, drug trafficking, law reports, proceeds of crime by sally

Regina v Brooks [2016] EWCA Crim 44

‘Following the seizure of a large consignment of cocaine by the Irish navy, the defendant was convicted in the United Kingdom of conspiracy to import drugs and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In confiscation proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the recorder ruled that the defendant had a criminal lifestyle for the purposes of section 75 of the 2002 Act. He assessed the defendant’s benefit as being a little over £3·6m, comprising the value of the drugs at just under £3m and a 50% interest in a Spanish property valued at £296,000, and held that the recoverable amount was the same as the benefit figure on the basis that, although the defendant’s identifiable assets amounted to just under £1,400, he had undisclosed assets which he had failed to show were less than his benefit. Accordingly, the recorder made a confiscation order in the sum of the benefit figure. The defendant appealed against the order on the grounds that the recorder had erred in (i) including the value of the drugs in the benefit figure on the basis that the defendant had purchased them or contributed to their purchase, when there was no evidence that the defendant had done so; (ii) including the value of the drugs in the recoverable amount, when they had been seized by the Irish authorities; and (iii) including the value of the property in the recoverable amount, when under Spanish law the defendant’s partner was the legal and equitable owner.’

WLR Daily, 10th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Regina v Roberts (Mark) and others- WLR Daily

Posted March 30th, 2016 in appeals, criminal justice, dangerous offenders, detention, human rights, interpretation, judicial review, jurisdiction, law reports, proportionality, sentencing, time limits by sally

Regina v Roberts (Mark) and others [2016] EWCA Crim 71

‘In each of the 13 applications before the court, the applicants applied for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal against sentences of imprisonment or detention for public protection (“IPP”)), imposed between 2005 and 2008 under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Before the sentence of IPP was amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, the court was required to make the assumption that an offender was dangerous if he had been convicted on an earlier occasion of a specified offence, unless it was unreasonable to do so. Where he was found to be dangerous, and over 18, the court was required to pass a sentence of IPP or life imprisonment; the 2003 Act removed all discretion from the court once it was found that the offender was dangerous. All the applicants had either been detained in custody long after the expiry of the minimum term or had been recalled for breach of licence. The applicants submitted (1) that whatever might have been the position at the time the sentences of IPP were passed, the Court of Appeal had power under section 11 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to pass sentences that, in the light of what had happened over the intervening years, now would be the proper sentence; (2) the Court of Appeal should reconsider the assessments made by sentencing judges in the light of R v Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864; [2006] 1 WLR 2509, and (3) a time could and had been reached when the length of the imprisonment was so excessive and disproportionate compared to the index criminal offence that it could amount to inhuman treatment under article 3 or arbitrary detention under article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. That was because the detention no longer had any meaningful link to the index offence. A much delayed review of a sentencing decision could therefore be a mechanism the court could employ to avoid a breach of those Convention Rights. As the period now served by each of the applicants was so much longer than any conceivable determinate sentence would have required, the continued detention amounted to preventative detention and was therefore arbitrary. ‘

WLR Daily, 18th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Regina (Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Britain and others) v Charity Commission – WLR Daily

Posted March 30th, 2016 in charities, Charity Commission, data protection, documents, human rights, inquiries, judicial review, law reports, privacy, proportionality, sexual offences by sally

Regina (Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Britain and others) v Charity Commission [2016] EWCA Civ 154

‘Following three trials of former members of Jehovah’s Witnesses’s congregations on charges of historic sex abuse the Charity Commission decided to initiate a statutory inquiry relating to a leading Jehovah’s Witness charity’s safeguarding policy regarding vulnerable beneficiaries in particular children, under section 46 of the Charities Act 2011, and to order the charity to produce a wide range of documents, under section 52 of the Act, even though none of those accused was connected with the charity. .The applicants, the charity and its trustees, sought judicial review of those decisions, on the grounds that (i) the commission had acted disproportionately by commencing an inquiry the scope of which was vague and undefined and by interfering with the applicants’ Convention rights, and had thereby breached its duty to act fairly so that the decision was irrational; and (ii) the scope of the production order was disproportionate in that information was sought of a personal and sensitive nature, within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998, and was furthermore in breach of the Convention rights of individuals affected. The judge in refusing permission to proceed with the judicial review clain held that the applicants had an effective statutory remedy by appealing to the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (Charity) against a decision to initiate an inquiry, and that any complaint relating to the breadth of a production order could be dealt with before that tribunal.’

WLR Daily, 15th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Swindon Borough Council v Webb (trading as Protective Coatings) – WLR Daily

Posted March 30th, 2016 in appeals, civil procedure rules, committals, contempt of court, early release, law reports, local government, proportionality by sally

Swindon Borough Council v Webb (trading as Protective Coatings) [2016] EWCA Civ 152

‘Whilst hesitating to be prescriptive in a matter where the liberty of the subject is at stake, and where the circumstances are likely to be infinitely various, the procedure provided by CPR r 81.31 should be followed where a contemnor seeks his discharge before the expiry of his sentence (para 23).’

WLR Daily, 16th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Horada and others v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and others – WLR Daily

Posted March 21st, 2016 in appeals, compulsory purchase, inquiries, law reports, local government, planning, reasons by sally

Horada and others v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and others: [2016] EWCA Civ 169

‘Pursuant to its power under section 226(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the local planning authority made a compulsory purchase order in respect of land which included a well known market. The claimant and the market traders’ association objected and a public inquiry was held. The planning inspector recommended that the order not be confirmed. The Secretary of State issued a decision confirming the order, ostensibly giving reasons for departing from the inspector’s recommendation. The judge dismissed the claimant’s challenge to the validity of the order under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. The claimant and the association appealed on the grounds that the reasons given by the Secretary of State for departing from the inspector’s recommendation were inadequate and/or inadequately expressed.’

WLR Daily, 18th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Apollo Fuels Ltd and others – WLR Daily

Posted March 21st, 2016 in employment, HM Revenue & Customs, income tax, law reports, leases, remuneration, tribunals by sally

Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Apollo Fuels Ltd and others; [2016] EWCA Civ 157

‘The employers leased cars to their employees to enable them to carry out their duties. The cars were leased on arm’s length commercial terms, including lease charges at full market value. The revenue concluded that the provision of the cars was a taxable benefit, for the purposes of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, and served notices of assessment for that tax on the employees. The First-tier Tribunal allowed the employees’ appeal, holding that the provision of the cars was a “benefit” which fell within section 114 of the 2003 Act with the result that Chapter 6 of Part 3 of the 2003 Act applied. That decision was affirmed by the Upper Tribunal.’

WLR Daily, 17th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Gentry v Miller and another – WLR Daily

Posted March 15th, 2016 in appeals, civil procedure rules, law reports, setting aside by sally

Gentry v Miller and another [2016] EWCA Civ 141

‘When dealing with an application under CPR r 13.3 to set aside a judgment in default of acknowledgement of service entered under CPR Pt 12 or an application under CPR r 39.3(5) to set aside a judgment given where a party did not attend the trial, the court should first establish whether the express requirements of rule 13.3 or rule 39.3(5) were satisfied and, if so, apply the three-stage test laid down for the exercise of the discretion under rule 3.9 to grant relief from sanctions. The first stage of the test, as to whether there was a serious or significant breach, applies to the applicant’s default in failing to acknowledge service or to attend trial, not to any subsequent delay in applying to set the judgment aside (paras 23–25).’

WLR Daily, 9th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Alan Ramsay Sales & Marketing Ltd v Typhoo Tea Ltd – WLR Daily

Posted March 15th, 2016 in agency, agreements, contracts, evidence, law reports, privilege by sally

Alan Ramsay Sales & Marketing Ltd v Typhoo Tea Ltd [2016] EWHC 486 (Comm)

‘The claimant was a commercial agent who acted for the defendant. The agency agreement between the parties provided for 12 months’ notice of termination. The claimant’s case was that, by e-mails dated 18 and 26 March 2013, the defendant gave notice of termination with effect from 11 February 2013, to terminate on 11 May 2013 and was thereby in repudiatory breach of contract, which repudiation the claimant accepted as bringing the agency agreement to an end. The claimant brought a claim for, inter alia, damages for termination with insufficient notice and sought to admit the defendant’s e-mails as evidence of the defendant’s repudiation. The defendant contended that the two e-mails, both marked “Without Prejudice”, were part of a series of without prejudice negotiations to settle a dispute as to termination of the agency and that, as such, they could not be relied on by the claimant as repudiatory and were inadmissible in evidence.’

WLR Daily, 8th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

UBS AG v Revenue and Customs Comrs; DB Group Services (UK) Ltd v Revenue and Customs Comrs – WLR Daily

Posted March 15th, 2016 in appeals, banking, employment, forfeiture, income tax, law reports by sally

UBS AG v Revenue and Customs Comrs; DB Group Services (UK) Ltd v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2016] UKSC 13

‘In 2004 two banks entered into arrangements designed to take advantage of the provisions of Chapter 2 of Part 7 of the lncome Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, as substituted, which created a special regime for employment-related securities whereby “restricted securities” (including, by section 423(2), shares which were subject to a condition providing for their forfeiture in certain circumstances so as to render their market value less than it otherwise would be but for that condition) were, by section 425(2) and 429, exempt from income tax. Each bank invoked a scheme whereby (i) it set up a company merely for the purposes of the scheme, which undertook no activities beyond its participation in the scheme, was to be liquidated upon the termination of the scheme, and the memorandum and articles of which contained conditions designed to comply with Chapter 2, and (ii) the shares of the company were to be allocated to specified employees in lieu of a cash bonus. In the first case there was a condition for an immediate and automatic sale of the shares if, on any date during a specified three week period, the closing value of the FTSE 100 Index exceeded a defined “trigger level”, the probability of which was unlikely but in any event was hedged against so that in the event of a forced sale the employees would not be materially worse off. In the second case there was a provision which, in effect, provided that an employee would forfeit his shares if he voluntarily resigned or was dismissed for misconduct during the first eight weeks after the company was set up. In both cases, once the exemptions from income tax conferred by sections 425(2) and 429 had accrued, the shares were redeemable by the employees for cash. The revenue took the view that the banks were to be treated as having paid the relevant employees cash sums equal to their share allocation and issued PAYE determinations and NIC decisions against each bank, as the body liable to deduct such sums. Each bank appealed. The First-tier Tribunal, in separate decisions, held that Parliament could not have intended that the exemption should apply to arrangements contrived purely in order to obtain the exemption but having no other business or commercial purpose. On appeals heard together the Upper Tribunal held that the scheme in the first case met the requirements of the legislation and so allowed that bank’s appeal, but held that the scheme in the second case did not fully comply with the terms of Chapter 2 in that, on the facts, the company had been set up in a way which did not comply with section 429. On appeal by the revenue in the first case and by the bank in the second case, the Court of Appeal upheld the Upper Tribunal’s decision in the first case on like ground and, having reversed the factual finding in the second case, allowed that bank’s appeal on the ground that its scheme also met the requirements of Chapter 2.’

WLR Daily, 9th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Secretary of State for the Home Department v Khan – WLR Daily

Posted March 15th, 2016 in appeals, immigration, law reports, visas by sally

Secretary of State for the Home Department v Khan [2016] EWCA Civ 137

‘The applicant, a Pakistani national, entered the United Kingdom with leave to remain. On 20 February 2012, before the expiry of his leave, he applied under section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 for further leave to remain as a Tier 4 student, intending to study at a particular college which at that time was a registered licensed sponsor. However, by the time the United Kingdom Border Agency came to consider his application, the licence of his sponsoring college had been revoked. The agency suspended consideration of the application to enable the applicant to find a new sponsor and then submit an application to vary the grounds of his original application for further leave to remain, which the applicant did on 9 October 2012. Paragraph 34E of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules provided that if a person wished to “vary the purpose” of an application for leave to remain, the variation had to comply with the requirements for making an application as if the variation were a new application, or the variation would be invalid. The agency refused the applicant’s application to vary the grounds of his original application since, on 9 October 2012, he did not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1A(a) of Appendix C to the Immigration Rules, which provided that an applicant had to have a certain level of maintenance funds “at the date of the application”. The applicant’s appeal against that decision was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal, holding that paragraph 34E did not apply in the applicant’s case since the applicant had not sought to vary the “purpose” of his application, which throughout had remained the same, namely to remain as a Tier 4 student; and that, therefore, the applicant had not been obliged to meet the maintenance fund requirements on 9 October 2012.’

WLR Daily, 18th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Director of Public Prosecutions v Henderson – WLR Daily

Posted March 15th, 2016 in crime, harassment, law reports, racism by sally

Director of Public Prosecutions v Henderson [2016] EWHC 464 (Admin)

‘The defendant was charged with three offences of racially aggravated harassment, contrary to section 31(1)(b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and, in the alternative, three offences of harassment, contrary to section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986. Both sets of offences were alleged to have been committed against the same victims and arose out of the same set of facts. Following the trial, the defendant was convicted of the three racially aggravated offences but, having heard submissions from the defendant’s representative, the district judge declined to announce a verdict on the section 4A offences (“the underlying offences”) and adjourned the case. The matter came before a different district judge who concluded that the facts of the underlying offences had been proved before the district judge at trial with the result that guilty verdicts should be returned in relation to the three underlying offences, with no separate penalty being imposed. In so doing, the district judge rejected the defendant’s submission that the correct course of action, the aggravated offences having been proved, was to adjourn the underlying offences sine die pursuant to the power in section 10 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. The defendant challenged his conviction on the underlying offences by way of an appeal by case stated.’

WLR Daily, 9th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Cocking and another v Eacott and another – WLR Daily

Posted March 15th, 2016 in appeals, families, landlord & tenant, law reports, nuisance by sally

Cocking and another v Eacott and another [2016] EWCA Civ 140

‘The second defendant owned but did not occupy a property. She granted the first defendant, her daughter, a bare licence to live there. The second defendant paid all the bills and maintained the property and her daughter did not pay any rent. The claimant owners of the next door property complained about the excessive barking of the daughter’s dog. The claimants wrote a letter before action to which the second defendant responded that a landlord was not liable for nuisance committed by a tenant, that she was not personally involved in the alleged incidents and that she was estranged from her daughter. The claimants issued proceedings against the second defendant and her daughter for nuisance. The second defendant served a notice to quit on her daughter and obtained a possession order which she did not enforce. The second defendant did not accept the claimants’ offer of a settlement if she permanently evicted her daughter from the property. The judge held that the second defendant was liable in nuisance to the claimants even though she did not occupy the property from which the nuisance emanated, concluding that liability attached once the owner knew or was deemed to know of the nuisance and had failed after a reasonable time to abate it and therefore if the owner chose to do nothing then she became liable for it with the actual creator of the nuisance.’

WLR Daily, 9th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Littlestone and others v Macleish – WLR Daily

Posted March 15th, 2016 in appeals, civil procedure rules, costs, law reports, part 36 offers by sally

Littlestone and others v Macleish [2016] EWCA Civ 127

‘An admitted payment on account of a claim following a Part 36 offer to settle a claim of a higher amount was, in the absence of contrary agreement, made as much on account of the Part 36 offer as on account of the full sum claimed. It would be an absurdity for a defendant to be bound to pay an aggregated total of a Part 36 offer and an admissions payment that was larger than the total sum claimed (paras 23–24).’

WLR Daily, 10th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

John v Central Manchester and Manchester Children’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust – WLR Daily

Posted March 7th, 2016 in causation, contribution, damages, delay, law reports, negligence, personal injuries by sally

John v Central Manchester and Manchester Children’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust: [2016] EWHC 407 (QB)

‘The claimant suffered a head injury and was taken to a hospital managed by the defendant. A CT scan was performed some six hours after his admission and he was transferred to another hospital where he underwent surgery. He was left with cognitive and neuropsychological deficits. He claimed damages in negligence against the defendant contending, inter alia, that the defendant’s negligent delay in undertaking the CT scan had resulted in a period of raised intra-cranial pressure which had caused or materially contributed to his brain damage. The defendant contended that only if the claimant could establish that damaging raised intra-cranial pressure caused by the defendant’s negligence had caused his brain injury that, applying the classic “but for” test of causation, he could recover as against the defendant, and that it was insufficient to establish “material contribution”.’

WLR Daily, 16th March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

Regina (Orbital Shopping Park Swindon Ltd) v Swindon Borough Council – WLR Daily

Posted March 7th, 2016 in interpretation, judicial review, law reports, local government, planning by sally

Regina (Orbital Shopping Park Swindon Ltd) v Swindon Borough Council: [2016] EWHC 448 (Admin)

‘The claimant submitted two separate planning applications to the defendant: one for the installation of a mezzanine floor at its property; and the other for external works to the property, which created no additional floor space. The defendant granted planning permission for both applications, informing the claimant that the mezzanine installation was development liable to a community infrastructure levy (“CIL”). The defendant’s view was that the development proposals fell within the scope of the meaning of development for CIL purposes due to the direct link between the two applications for the mezzanine and external alterations. The defendant, as the relevant CIL collecting authority, subsequently issued a CIL liability notice under regulation 65 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 in relation to the installation of a mezzanine floor and external alterations at the claimant’s property, and a demand notice under regulation 69 of the 2010 Regulations in respect of the same development. By a judicial review claim the claimant challenged the lawfulness of the defendant’s act in issuing the two notices on the grounds that the mezzanine planning permission fell within the exemption created by regulation 6(1)(c) and that the external planning permission created no floor space and so was not liable to a CIL.’

WLR daily, 3rd March 2016

Source: www.iclr.co.uk

R v Jogee (Appellant) – Supreme Court

Posted February 18th, 2016 in appeals, joint enterprise, jury directions, law reports, murder, Supreme Court by sally

R v Jogee (Appellant) [2016] UKSC 8 (YouTube)

Supreme Court, 18th February 2016

Source: www.youtube.com/user/UKSupremeCourt