‘Lord Judge delivered a lecture on the topic of “Constitutional Change: Unfinished Business”.’
UCL Constitutional Unit, 17th December 2013
Source: www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit
‘The Court of Appeal will soon be delivering judgment in a high-profile clash between the head of Thailand’s football federation, Dato Worawi Makudi, and Lord Triesman, the former chairman of the FA, which raises an issue of high constitutional importance.’
Sports Law Bulletin from Blackstone Chambers, 9th December 2013
Source: www.sportslawbulletin.org
‘The Supreme Court issued its decision in H v Lord Advocate (pdf) in 2012. The decision has been virtually ignored by constitutional scholars, but we believe it may be of great constitutional significance. In this post we explain why, starting with some background about constitutional statutes.’
UK Constitutional Law Group, 26th November 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/blog
‘Confusion abounds about the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights following Mr Justice Mostyn’s recent judgment in R (AB) v Home Secretary (in which he appeared to say the Charter puts into UK law all sorts of new rights British governments had wanted to exclude) and Tuesday’s reaction by the Lord Chancellor Chris Grayling (who, it’s reported, is urgently trying to clarify whether the Charter ”applies in the UK”).’
Head of Legal, 21st November 2013
Source: www.headoflegal.com
“The intention of this post is a simple one: to assess the ways in which natural justice arguments have historically been raised in private law proceedings. By ‘natural justice’ I mean those common law principles requiring a fair procedure and an unbiased tribunal when powers are exercised. Ordinarily, of course, natural justice arguments arise in judicial review proceedings against public bodies in the Administrative Court or Upper Tribunal, usually when those bodies are exercising a statutory power. But to what extent can it be argued that a private body, in its private relations with private individuals, has acted unlawfully by making decisions in a procedurally unfair manner?”
UK Constitutional Law Group, 21st November 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org
“In his recent annual lecture to the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar Association, Lord Carnwath spoke to the title: ‘From judicial outrage to sliding scales—where next for Wednesbury?’ In this post, I outline some of the key points made in the lecture and offer some critical commentary on the approach to substantive judicial review commended by Carnwath.”
UK Constitutional Law Group, 20th November 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org
From judicial outrage to sliding scales – where next for Wednesbury? (PDF)
Lord Carnwath
ALBA Annual Lecture, 12th November 2013
Source: www.supremecourt.gov.uk
“Recent events in the US have made us all aware of the essential vulnerability of modern political and economic systems. For a while it seemed as though the most powerful economy in the world was heading towards self-destruction, owing to the failure of a small number of senior politicians to reach a consensus that would avoid such an outcome. Now that disaster has been at least temporarily averted, it seems appropriate to try to analyse how this situation arose.”
Halsbury’s Law Exchange, 28th October 2013
Source: www.halsburyslawexchange.co.uk
“Courts and commentators have sometimes said the administrative law doctrine of legitimate expectations is incoherent. They say that the various ways of acquiring a legitimate expectation do not hang together; nothing unifies them. For example, Lord Brown in Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago agreed with a commentator’s description of the doctrine of legitimate expectations as a mere ‘patchwork’ and ‘little more than a mechanism to dispense palm-tree justice’. Both Richard Clayton and Mark Elliott have in the past favoured the ‘disaggregation’ of the doctrine.”
UK Constitutional Law Group, 18th October 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/blog
“Writing in his magisterial new work, Human Rights and the UK Supreme Court, Professor Brice Dickson noted that the Human Rights Act had created ‘an internationalized system of human rights protection rather than a constitutional one.’ Indeed, there had been a marked resistance on the part of the Supreme Court to use the common law to achieve the same goal of human rights protection. In Osborn v The Parole Board the Supreme Court seemed to resile from this position.”
UK Human Rights Blog, 13th October 2013
Source: www.ukhumanrightsblog.com
“In a recent interview in The Spectator, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Chris Grayling MP, was given another opportunity to recite the now characteristic Tory Siren call relating to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Strasbourg court.”
UK Constitutional Law Group, 30th September 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org
“This is a major initiative being undertaken by LSE Law Department and the LSE’s Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) together with Democratic Audit UK and LSE Public Policy Group.”
UK Constitutional Law Group, 28th September 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org
“There is a very good article in the most recent edition of the Law Quarterly Review. It is by Rodney Brazier, and is concerned with the nature and mechanics of royal assent. It is a fascinating read, and, as with all Brazier’s work, characterised by a dry wit. There is, however, one claim, made almost in passing, that I think is mistaken. Brazier addresses the question of when, if ever, a monarch could properly refuse to give assent to legislation. He rightly concludes that it is almost impossible to imagine situations in which assent should be refused, but leaves open the possibility that it might be appropriate for the Monarch to refuse assent if advised to do so by her Ministers. In suggesting that royal assent could be refused on ministerial advice Brazier is not alone. The assertion has also been made by Geoffrey Marshall in Constitutional Conventions, and Adam Tomkins in Public Law – and may, for all I know, have been made by others, too. On the other hand, Anne Twomey (in an article in Public Law in 2006) argued that the issue remains open, and gives a number of examples, mostly from Australia, which suggest the Monarch need not accept the advice of her Ministers to refuse assent. So which position is correct? If the Prime Minister (or the Cabinet, collectively) advised the Queen to refuse to give her assent to legislation, what, constitutionally, should she do?”
UK Constitutional Law Group, 25th September 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org
“Britain’s Supreme Court should make final rulings on contentious human rights cases, not the European Court of Human Rights, the Justice Secretary has said.”
Daily Telegraph, 25th September 2013
Source: www.telegraph.co.uk
“Does the recent vote in the House of Commons on military action against Syria have real constitutional significance? Is it the final piece of evidence that there is a constitutional convention that the consent of the House of Commons must be sought before armed force is used? If so, should anything be done to concretise and clarify this Convention? And what is the broader constitutional significance of this episode in terms of the evolution of controls over the prerogative power and its significance for the evolving separation of powers in the UK?”
UK Constitutional Law Group, 19th September 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org
“Writers on the British constitution have always faced the problem that, contrary to what Mr Podsnap thought, it cannot simply be held up to the light and admired. The constitution is simultaneously a description of how, for the moment, we are governed and a prescriptive account of how we ought to be governed. In both respects (the former much more than the latter) it undergoes constant change; and there are concerns, highlighted by the radical changes currently being made to the legal aid system, that the process may be accelerating into a critical and damaging phase.”
London Review of Books, 12th September 2013
Source: www.lrb.co.uk
“The morally and politically charged area of assisted suicide has many of the hallmarks of an insoluble problem. This has not prevented courts in some jurisdictions considering how they might ‘legalise’ assisted suicide without really legalising it. In doing so, they have raised manifold challenges in the minds of administrative and constitutional lawyers, including, in some jurisdictions, whether the prohibition on assisted suicide is itself constitutional, such as Rodriguez in Canada, Fleming in Ireland and Pretty in the ECtHR.”
UK Constitutional Law Group, 7th August 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org
“This week, the government’s controversial legislation on same sex marriage received Royal Assent. And, as we welcome a new royal baby, less glamorous facets of the UK’s constitutional arrangements have been in the news.”
UK Human Rights Blog, 23rd July 2013
Source: www.ukhumanrightsblog.com
“In anticipation of the birth of the Royal baby, Parliament passed the Succession to the Crown Act in April 2013. It provides that in future the eldest child will be next in line of succession, whether it is a girl or a boy. The law will not come into force in time for the Royal birth, but the new baby when born will be next in line. This Blog post explains the background, and the difficulties involved in changing the rules of succession.”
UK Constitutional Law Group, 15th July 2013
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org
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