‘Claire Molyneux, Senior Associate and Naomi Shelton, Associate, both of Mills & Reeve LLP, analyse the news and case law relating to financial remedies and divorce during October 2016.’
Family Law Week, 13th November 2016
Source: www.familylawweek.co.uk
‘Norma Cronin, solicitor at Hughes Fowler Carruthers and Mark Ablett, Senior Paralegal at Hughes Fowler Carruthers and soon to be pupil barrister at 1 Garden Court Family Law Chambers consider the troublesome issue of enforcement of undertakings in financial remedies cases.’
Family Law Week, 8th July 2016
Source: www.familylawweek.co.uk
‘Edward Heaton, Principal Associate and Jane Booth, Associate, both of Mills & Reeve LLP analyse the news and case law relating to financial remedies and divorce during February 2016.’
Family Law Week, 5th March 2016
Source: www.familylawweek.co.uk
‘On 14 October the Supreme Court (SC) gave judgments in Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60 and Gohil v Gohil [2015] UKSC 61. Both Mrs Sharland and Mrs Gohil were successful in the respective consent orders being set aside due to significant non-disclosure by their former husbands.’
Law Society’s Gazette, 7th December 2015
Source: www.lawgazette.co.uk
‘Edward Heaton, Principal Associate and Jane Booth, Associate, both of Mills & Reeve LLP analyse the news and case law relating to financial remedies and divorce during October 2015.’
Family Law Week, 3rd November 2015
Source: www.familylawweek.co.uk
‘This was an appeal against a ruling by Mostyn J in the Court of Protection concerning a consent order between an incapacitated woman, the appellant, and the local authority ([2015] EWCOP 13). The judge had held that the 52 year old appellant, who had been severely incapacitated following surgery, had not been subject to deprivation of liberty contrary to Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights by her 24 hour care package. In his view, the test for deprivation of liberty in Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19 did not apply. In paragraph 17 of his judgment Mostyn J remarked that it was impossible to see how the protective measures in place for KW could linguistically be characterised as a “deprivation of liberty”. Quoting from JS Mill, he said that the protected person was “merely in a state to require being taken care of by others, [and] must be protected against their own actions as well as external injury”. At para 25, he said that he found that KW was not “in any realistic way being constrained from exercising the freedom to leave, in the required sense, for the essential reason that she does not have the physical or mental ability to exercise that freedom”.’
UK Human Rights Blog, 21st October 2015
Source: www.ukhumanrightsblog.com
‘The Court of Appeal has allowed an appeal in a case over whether a woman was being deprived of her liberty in her own home, and in the process criticised a High Court judge who maintains that the majority decision in the Supreme Court’s Cheshire West ruling is wrong.’
Local Government Lawyer, 21st October 2015
Source: www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk
Williams v Law Society of England and Wales [2015] EWHC 2302 (Ch); [2015] WLR (D) 360
‘Where an intervention took place into a solicitor’s practice and a resolution was made under paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974 for the vesting of moneys in connection with the solicitors current or former practice, it was moneys connected with that solicitor’s activities as a solicitor which vested in the Society.’
WLR Daily, 30th July 2015
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘A curious case on the effect of a s.198 Housing Act 1996 referral of a homeless applicant to another Authority.’
Nearly Legal, 21st June 2015
Source: www.nearlylegal.co.uk
CS v ACS and another [2015] EWHC 1005 (Fam); [2015] WLR (D) 171
‘The final sentence in paragraph 14.1 of Practice Direction 30A supplementing FPR Pt 30, stating that a consent order made by a district judge could be challenged only by way of an appeal, encroached on the right of a litigant in certain circumstances to apply to the court without first obtaining permission and was therefore ultra vires and should be treated as a nullity.’
WLR Daily, 16th April 2015
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘Hamblen J observed that “the facts…are so extraordinary that they could have come from one of A.P. Herbert’s “Misleading Cases”. Yes indeed. A solicitor decided to make up three years of litigation, writing some fake judgments, pretending to instruct barristers, and churning out fictitious correspondence.’
UK Human Rights Blog, 25th November 2014
Source: www.ukhumanrightsblog.com
‘The Secretary of State was not required by Parliament and Council Directive 2001/92/EC to conduct a transboundary consultation with the Republic of Ireland before granting planning permission to construct a nuclear power station near the Irish state if he was convinced that it was not “likely to have significant effects on the environment in another member state”, within article 7 of the Directive.’
WLR Daily, 1st August 2014
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘If a consent order affected orders made by a judge it was advisable at first instance that any applications in respect of such an order should be made to a judge rather than a master. The court retained a general discretion whether before or after the parties had seen a draft judgment to continue to deliver a judgment where it was appropriate so to do. Even if the parties had effectively put an end to the dispute between themselves, that in itself could not stop the court from raising matters which concerned it.’
WLR Daily, 15th July 2014
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘In the light of TF v PJ [2014] EWHC 1780 (Fam), Francis Wilkinson, barrister of Field Court Chambers, asks whether an application to set aside is permissible where there has been a change of circumstances which undermines the basis of a consent order – and suggests an answer.’
Family Law Week, 18th June 2014
Source: www.familylawweek.co.uk
‘Filing the papers can be cheap, but to ensure you get the outcome you want you will probably have to spend more.’
Daily Telegraph, 3rd June 2014
Source: www.telegraph.co.uk
Gohil v Gohil (No 2): [2014] EWCA Civ 274; [2014] WLR (D) 126
‘It was not open to a first instance judge in family proceedings to set aside a financial relief order solely on the basis that there was fresh evidence sufficient to satisfy the guidelines which applied to the admission of fresh evidence in the Court of Appeal.’
WLR Daily, 13th March 2014
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Mann v Mann: [2014] EWHC 537 (Fam); [2014] WLR (D) 114
‘In proceedings to enforce an order for ancillary relief, not governed by FPR Pt 9, where the parties had made an agreement to engage in alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) the court could exercise its powers under FPR r 3.3(1)(b) to enable ADR to take place even if one party was trying to back out of that agreement. Although it was not possible to compel the parties to take part in mediation, since that would operate as a bar to enforcement, it was possible to robustly encourage mediation by means of an “Ungley order” to make it clear that an unreasonable refusal to participate in the ADR might well attract a costs sanction.’
WLR Daily, 5th March 2014
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘Sarah Foreman, a solicitor at Vardags, analyses the Court of Appeal judgment in Sharland v. Sharland.’
Family Law Week, 28th February 2014
Source: www.familylawweek.co.uk
‘The recent decision in MA A Lloyd & Sons Ltd v PPC International Ltd [2014] EWHC 41 (QB) provides that parties who agree to extend time for service of witness statements must also apply to the Court for an order by consent. A mere written agreement is not sufficient. In the post-Mitchell, post-Lloyd world, parties are increasingly unlikely to agree extensions of time. Tom Shepherd considers the decision in Lloyd and highlights some practical pointers which parties who need to make or respond to an application to extend time for witness statements can consider. He also explains why this decision leaves us with a few unresolved questions.’
11 Stone Buildings, February 2014
Source: www.11sb.com
