‘Asset Land’s appeal rejected by the supreme court but the City regulator says investors “are likely only to get a fraction of their money back”.’
The Guardian, 20th April 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘A woman has been jailed for conning more than £250,000 out of her parents by convincing them she was a successful student at Oxford University and needed money for research projects and travel.’
The Guardian, 20th April 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘A judge has criticised a culture of “excessive drinking” and sexual relationships within the Royal Military Police, as two former soldiers were acquitted of raping a colleague who later killed herself.’
Daily Telegraph, 20th April 2016
Source: www.telegraph.co.uk
‘Britain’s intelligence agencies have been secretly collecting bulk personal data since the late 1990s and privately admit they have gathered information on people who are “unlikely to be of intelligence or security interest”.’
The Guardian, 21st April 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘More than 5,000 people were conned into sending planned payments to fraudsters’ bank accounts last year.’
BBC News, 21st April 2016
Source: www.bbc.co.uk
SI 2016/511 – The Welfare Reform Act 2012 (Commencement No. 28) Order 2016
SI 2016/504 – The Belarus (Asset-Freezing) (Amendment) Regulations 2016
SI 2016/503 – The Export Control (Iran Sanctions) Order 2016
SI 2016/512 – The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (Commencement No. 10) Order 2016
SI 2016/508 – The Templeton Training Area Byelaws 2016
SI 2016/502 – The Jobseeker’s Allowance (Extended Period of Sickness) Amendment Regulations 2016
Source: www.legislation.gov.uk
‘Record numbers of web pages containing child sexual abuse images are being detected following a dramatic rise in reports, a watchdog has revealed.’
Daily Telegraph, 21st April 2016
Source: www.telegraph.co.uk
High Court (Commercial Court)
High Court (Family Division)
High Court (Patents Court)
High Court (Queen’s Bench Division)
High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions
Source: www.bailii.org
‘Claims an undercover officer set fire to a high street department store while infiltrating animal rights campaigners are being investigated by the police.’
The Independent, 20th April 2016
Source: www.independent.co.uk
Sparks and others v Department for Transport [2016] EWCA Civ 360
‘A provision in the employer’s staff handbook stated that where in any 12 month period the employee had taken a number of short term absences which together exceeded 21 working days, the employee’s line manager would discuss his attendance record with him, and only if those “trigger points” had been exceeded and the line manager had consequently acknowledged that there was a problem with the employee’s attendance would the line manager take the matter forward in accordance with the relevant attendance procedures. The handbook provided that all it provisions which applied to the particular employee and were apt for incorporation should be incorporated into the employee’s contract of employment. The provision in question was in a part of the handbook on ill health, which contained the following introductory words: “This chapter sets out your terms and conditions of employment relating to sick leave … [and] the management of poor attendance….” Seven employees, all of whom were employed by different agencies within the same government department and were subject to somewhat different but materially similar provisions, brought claims contending that those provisions were terms of the contracts of employment between them and their employer. The employer maintained that the provisions were not legally enforceable contractual terms but mere notes of guidance or good practice of no legal force. The provision in respect of cumulative short-term absences in the first employee’s documents was taken to determine the question between the employer and all the employees. The judge held that the provisions were terms of the employees’ contracts of employment, and made declarations to that effect. As a result the judge declared that a new policy of attendance management introduced by the employer in July 2012 had not been effective to vary the contractual terms of the employment contracts and was not contractually binding on the employees.’
WLR Daily, 14th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘Civil Recovery claims commenced under Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”) must be brought under CPR 8 in accordance with paragraph 4.1 of the Civil Recovery Proceedings Practice Direction.’
Judiciary of England and Wales, 15th April 2016
Source: www.judiciary.gov.uk
Webb (by her litigation friend) v Liverpool Women’s NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWCA Civ 365
‘The claimant succeeded in her claim against the defendant for medical negligence in the management of her birth, during which she suffered a Brachial Plexus Injury as a result of shoulder dystocia. The claimant had earlier made a CPR Pt 36 offer to settle liability on the basis that she received 65% of the damages that would accrue on a 100% basis, which had been rejected by the defendant. The judge upheld the first allegation under the claim, namely that the defendant had been negligent in not performing a caesarean section during the claimant’s delivery and held that as she had succeeded in establishing that her injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence, she was accordingly entitled to 100% of her claimed damages even though she had been unsuccessful in other specific allegations, including a freestanding second limb of the claim that the delivery itself was negligently managed. On the issue of costs, the claimant contended that because of the defendant’s refusal to accept the Part 36 offer of settlement which had been bettered by the claimant, the consequences of what was then CPR r 36.14(3) (now CPR r 36.17, as amended by The Civil Procedure (Amendment No 8) Rules (SI 2014/3299), reg 7, Sch 1) applied and as a result the court was unable to make an issues-based order, Part 36 comprising as it did an all or nothing self-contained regime; and that she should have all her costs on an indemnity basis from the expiry of the relevant period plus interest thereon at the enhanced “Part 36 rate” plus the enhancements specified in Part 36.14(3)(a) and (d). The defendant submitted that the normal cost consequences of CPR r 36.14(3) should be disapplied because, by reference to CPR r 36.14(4), in the circumstances, it would be unjust to apply them; that CPR Part 36 did not prevent the court from making an issues-based or proportionate costs order to reflect the fact that the claimant failed in respect of the second allegation, which was a discrete and independent allegation and that such an order was appropriate; and that therefore the claimant’s costs referable to the first allegation should be awarded with the CPR Part 36 enhancements but not those in respect of the unsuccessful second allegation. The judge held that (a) the engagement of the CPR Pt 36 cost consequences did not preclude the court from making an issues-based or proportionate costs order and the court had a discretion to make such an order, notwithstanding that the claimant was a successful claimant; and (b) that, in the circumstances of the case, it was just to make an issues-based proportionate costs order, under which the claimant would not recover her costs of the second allegation. He ordered that the claimant should recover her damages to be assessed with the 10% addition required by CPR r 36.14(3)(d), plus her costs, excluding those referable to the second allegation and that those costs, incurred after 22 October 2014, were to be assessed on an indemnity basis pursuant to CPR r 36.14(3)(d). The claimant appealed on the grounds that (a) on the true construction of Part 36, the discretion of the court under CPR r 36.14(3) was restricted to the enhancements to which a successful claimant was normally entitled in respect of damages, costs and interest, that the court did not have power under Part 36 to deprive a party of part of its costs on the basis that it had failed to establish part of its claim and that Part 36 excluded the normal discretion of the court to make an issues-based or proportionate costs order; (b) alternatively, that a successful claimant could only be deprived of her costs if it was shown that it would be unjust for her to recover all her costs; and (c) that the judge had erred in law in deciding that he could and should deprive the claimant of her costs attributable to the second allegation.’
WLR Daily, 14th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
In re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) (AIRE Centre and others intervening) [2016] UKSC 15
‘Two children, who like their parents were Hungarian nationals, were born in England and habitually resident in the United Kingdom, having lived with the same English foster carers for most of their lives, initially with the consent of their parents. The local authority sought a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 and, subsequently, an order for placement of the children with the foster carers with a view to their adoption pursuant to section 21 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. The mother, who had returned to Hungary and had a third child with the father, opposed the orders and applied under article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 for the proceedings to be transferred to Hungary. The Hungarian authorities supported her application, maintaining that only the Hungarian authorities could order the adoption of a Hungarian national minor. They proposed that upon return to Hungary the children would be placed with English speaking foster parents but maintain contact with their parents. The judge directed that both the care and placement order proceedings be transferred in accordance with article 15 on the ground that the Hungarian courts would be better placed to determine the welfare issues. The Court of Appeal decided, inter alia, that the placement order proceedings were outside the scope of article 15 by virtue of article 1(3)(b) of the Regulation and could not, therefore, be transferred to Hungary, but that, since the judge had not erred in ordering the transfer of the care proceedings, the placement order proceedings would be stayed even though they could not be transferred. ‘
WLR Daily, 13th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Auzins v Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Latvia [2016] EWHC 802 (Admin)
‘The appellant was arrested in Latvia in connection with four offences of theft. He admitted guilt in relation to some of the offences and was released subject to certain conditions. In breach of those conditions he left Latvia and subsequently came to live in England. He was arrested in Scotland pursuant to a European arrest warrant (“EAW”) issued by the Latvian judicial authority, and extradition proceedings followed in the Sheriff Court. He resisted extradition on health grounds. A letter from the Latvian authorities accepted that the medical treatment available within the Latvian prison system for the treatment of the appellant’s medical problems would be insufficient and incompatible with European guidelines. The court concluded that, while there were no bars to extradition under the section 11(1) of the Extradition Act 2003, the appellant’s physical condition was such that it would be oppressive to extradite him. Three years later, a replacement, second, EAW was issued, reflecting the fact that one of the offences for which extradition had originally been sought had become time barred. The appellant was arrested pursuant to the second EAW in England. Updated evidence from the Latvian authorities showed that the position as to the availability of treatment for the appellant’s conditions had improved in the intervening period. Following a contested hearing, the district judge ordered the appellant’s extradition. The appellant challenged that decision on grounds, inter alia, that the district judge should have discharged him because: (i) the issue of his surrender was res judicata or subject to an issue estoppel on account of his discharge in the earlier Scottish proceedings for substantially the same matters; alternatively, (ii) in seeking his surrender the Latvian authorities were abusing the process of the court.’
WLR Daily, 14th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Marussia Communications Ireland Ltd v Manor Grand Prix Racing Ltd and another [2016] EWHC 809 (Ch)
‘The claimant was the proprietor of a Community registered trade mark for the “Marussia” name and logo, which it licensed to the defendant to use for a certain period. The claimant brought a claim for trade mark infringement, claiming that the defendant had continued to use the trade mark after the licence period had ended and that the use of the “Marussia” name contravened article 9(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark. The defendants relied upon five defences, including consent of the claimant within the meaning of Council Regulation 207/2009. On the claimant’s application for summary judgment am issue arose as to whether, if it failed to prove the claimant had given consent, the defendant could none the less rely on English law principles of estoppel to achieve either the same or a similar result.’
WLR Daily, 13th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Regina (Hussain) v Parole Board of England and Wales [2016] EWHC 288 (Admin)
‘The claimant, an indeterminate sentence prisoner, was referred by the Secretary of State to the Parole Board for consideration of his suitability for transfer to open prison conditions for the remaining three years of his minimum custodial term (in accordance with the relevant National Offender Management Service guidance). The purpose of such a transfer was to enable the claimant to demonstrate during that period, and in those conditions, that he no longer posed a level of risk to the public that warranted further detention and could therefore be considered for release at, or shortly after, the expiry of his fixed tariff in 2017. The Board was obliged under the Parole Board Rules 2011 to consider the claimant’s suitability at an oral hearing within 26 weeks of receiving the referral and, although the case was made ready for listing in September 2014, it was only set down in the following February and subsequently heard in May 2015. The defendant accepted that the listing of oral hearings had been subject to substantial delays at the time due to a lack of resources but contended that the claimant had still been moved to open conditions some two years prior to the expiry of his tariff and therefore he had not lost the opportunity to show his suitability for release at the time of his tariff expiry date. The claimant brought a claim for judicial review, contending that the delay in listing the oral hearing was unlawful under common law and in breach of article 5.4 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as it had delayed his transfer to open prison conditions and consequently deprived him of the opportunity to demonstrate his suitability for release at, or shortly after, the expiry of his tariff.’
WLR Daily, 24th February 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘The defendant was charged with trespass with intent to commit a sexual offence contrary to section 63(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The prosecution case was that the defendant had entered a family’s home as a trespasser, and had been naked and touching his penis in the presence of family members: further, that while being ejected from the house by the father of the family, he had made an unseemly sexual suggestion. In interview with the police the defendant had denied ever having entered the house. On closure of the prosecution case the defendant submitted that there was no case to answer because the prosecution had not particularised the sexual offence which it was asserted that he had intended to commit. The prosecution submitted that it was sufficient that their case was that the intent relied on was to commit one or more of the offences set out in sections 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The trial judge rejected the submission of no case to answer and the defendant was convicted. The defendant appealed against conviction on the ground, among others, that the prosecution had been obliged to specify the sexual offence which it was asserted that the defendant had intended to commit.’
WLR Daily, 13th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Regina (Hallam) v Secretary of State for Justice; Regina (Nealon) v Same [2016] EWCA Civ 355
‘Both claimants were convicted of serious criminal offences and had their initial appeals against conviction dismissed. In the first case the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the claimant’s conviction for murder to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), which quashed it on the basis the safety of the conviction was undermined by the unsatisfactory nature of identification evidence and doubts as to whether the claimant’s alibi had been falsely made. In the second case the commission referred the claimant’s conviction for attempted rape to the Court of Appeal, which quashed it on the basis that the weakness of identification evidence and fresh DNA evidence taken from the victim’s clothing had had a substantial effect on the safety of the conviction. In both cases the Secretary of State refused the claimant compensation, under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, as amended, on the basis that he had failed to show beyond reasonable doubt that the claimant had not committed the offence. The claimants’ claims for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decisions, on the grounds that section 133(1ZA) of the 1988 Act (inserted by section 175 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and providing that there has been a miscarriage of justice in relation to a person convicted of a criminal offence “if and only if the new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence”) was incompatible with article 6.2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in that it infringed the presumption of innocence, were dismissed by the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division which held that (i) the court was bound by authority of the Supreme Court (and also of the Court of Appeal) to hold that article 6.2 of the Convention was not applicable to compensation decisions made under section 133 of the 1988 Act; and (ii) the statutory scheme under section 133 maintained the presumption of innocence, did not require the applicant for compensation to prove his innocence and that only if the Secretary of State was satisfied that the new fact conclusively showed his innocence was compensation to be paid. The court also refused the claimant in the second case permission to proceed with a claim for judicial review on the basis that the Secretary of State was obliged to carry out a full review of the material before him in a particular case to determine whether the claimant was innocent.’
WLR Daily, 11th April 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘A journalist argues that, unlike in the US, such deaths do not generate a national conversation because mainstream media platforms marginalise diverse voices.’
The Guardian, 19th April 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘The Government has a “duty” to safeguard the thousand-year-old practice of recording Britain’s laws on vellum, a minister has said as he confirmed his department has found the £80,000 needed to safeguard this “great tradition.”‘
Daily Telegraph, 20th April 2016
Source: www.telegraph.co.uk
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