‘In this paper I will engage with a position Felicity Kaganas has often elaborated upon, and with which I agree, namely, that lawmakers often mistake law’s messaging for law’s power. In doing so I will focus on the law’s management of parental status and the performance of parental responsibility. I will argue that English law’s disaggregation of parental status and parental function should have enabled law to distance itself from involvement-by-presumption in the particularities of the disputes between parents and other carers about children, and enabled it to perform a better, more situation-sensitive role in the management of those disputes. It should have allowed for a more pragmatic, less ideological and generalised, decision-making process for particular disputes, and paid better attention to the actual children at the heart of those disputes. I argue that, given the limits of the power of law in resolving family disputes (which I also elaborate in the paper), law has a limited role in these situations. There are other orders of power – beyond law – which affect the way in which legal power works and may misdirect (or, at least, redirect) its ambitions.’
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Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 17th October 2024
Source: www.tandfonline.com
