‘It is widely accepted that judicial and other constraints on executive powers have resulted in the acceptance of ‘unwanted’ (in contrast to targeted) immigration to liberal states. This has been shown in particular in the field of irregular migration and family migration through national case studies and small N research designs. So far, however, there has been little systematic analysis to trace variations in the constraints on executive power that exist in different destination states and how such differences have an impact on policy outcomes. This is especially so in a third area of ‘unwanted immigration’, namely the case of asylum-seekers and refugees. Drawing on a large-N dataset of OECD countries, this paper explores to what extent variation in non-majoritarian constraints on executive power is able to account for differences in domestic refugee law and protection extensiveness. We develop a cross-country and over time dataset combining mainly Lijphart’s index of judicial review to measure constraints with the IMPALA immigration policy database and UNHCR statistics to code protection regimes. Building on these variables the paper further seeks to identify and assess the effect of different choices in the setup of appeal bodies and status determination procedures in the area of asylum.’
Date: 21st January 2014, 5.30-7.30pm
Location: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Charles Clore House, 17 Russell Square, London WC1B 5DR
Charge: Free, registration required
More information can be found here.